Ton Deuteron Ploun

PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE

Two types of practical knowledge
1) techne – departmental and productive; practical knowledge exercised in a particular field with a view to producing a product. “Practical state with a true conception” (1140a10)
2) phronesis – architectonic and practical; practical knowledge exercised in pursuit of living well; directs individual technai to ensure they contribute to the goal of living well. “true practical state, with a conception, concerned with things good and bad for human beings” (1140b5-6)

The structure is that of deliberation – the individual has a conception of some end and deliberates about how to best achieve that end. If the choice is going to be reliable correct, then the individual must have true conceptions of both the end and the means of attaining the end.
* For techne, the intermediate steps specify the means by which the end is to be achieved
* For phronesis, the intermediate steps specify the ways in which the conception of the end can be realized

Theoretical and practical wisdom are continuous.
1) every intellectual faculty has as its function the attainment of truth
2) Aristotle attempts to fit practical knowledge into the axiomatic model of theoretical knowledge

The action-initiating function is inseparable from truth – rational action comes from decision (prohairesis) and correct decision requires that one’s desires are directed to the realization of a true description of the contemplated action as promoting the intended good.

Aristotle assumes there is an objective truth in the practical realm and he concerns himself with describing the methods by which one attains the truth.

With theoretical knowledge, knowledge consists of principles demonstrated via deduction and knowledge of the first principles themselves via induction. In practical knowledge, deduction is ‘replaced’ by deliberation. (Deliberation is the practical counterpart to deduction.)

Deliberation occurs when an “agent reasons from practical principles to decisions incorporating true descriptions of actions which are such as to promote the realization of those principles” (131).

Does it stop being deliberation when one incorporates false descriptions of actions? Is it still deliberation but it just stops being a method conducive to knowledge (since reasoning from false premises/descriptions will lead to false conclusions…)?

The question of how practical principles are known is one of the most difficult answers to uncover.

Aristotle puts forward three different accounts as to how practical principles are known…and these accounts are 1) prima facie incompatible with one another and 2) such that two of them appear to threaten the possibility of knowledge of principles.

The three accounts:
1) The practical principles are well grounded opinions…those opinions that are accepted by everyone or most people or the wise. A reliable grasp of these principles comes from critical enquiry.
2) One grasps principles through habituation of the appetites resulting (when applicable) in excellence of character. Having a reliable grasp of the principles comes from being raised in the right way.
3) One grasps principles by nous, which is a grasp of general principles gotten via induction from sensible particulars.

For account (1) it looks like the principles aren’t known but rather accepted because everyone else accepts them. This might make them plausible, but it doesn’t appear to make them true (or anything else, for that matter).
For account (2) it looks like the basic attitudes aren’t cognitive but rather affective.

Techne and phronesis are types of knowledge and states in which we possess the truth…so the possessor of those states must have a cognitively reliable grasp on true principles.

Looking back at (2), the mere habituation of appetites is too simplistic. We should take the notion of habituation of appetites as indicating that two things are happening: (1) appetitive responses are refined under the guidance of the intellect and (2) the intellect itself is being refined…it is obtaining clearer insights of ethical principles. So habituation itself presupposes the development of the intellect.

Thinking of the development of techne is useful here. A builder does not simply become a habituated automaton but instead becomes a good builder through reflective learning…both doing and reflecting (and refining on those reflections) of what he is doing. One wonders what the role of modeling oneself after the phronimos plays here. While one can certainly model the actions of the phronimos, it may be a bit more difficult to figure out the motivations and thought processes of the phronimos such that one can refine her intellect accordingly. Perhaps modeling the actions and reflecting on why the actions are the right ones is sufficient? (This makes sense…we are interested in practical understanding and one doesn’t come to have understanding merely by echoing the thoughts of one who does have understanding but instead of having worked out and comprehending the reasons herself…) This brings in the worry of error, of course.

Looking back at (1), we have two worries: 1) what is the scientific status of reputable opinions (endoxa) and thus of arguments from them and 2) does Aristotle claim that all or just some moral principles are endoxa? We might be able to answer those questions by looking at the distinction between principles of demonstration and ‘reputable’ principles accepted by most people. Principles of demonstration are known via deduction, reputable principles are known via dialectic. Dialectic plays an important role in examining first principles (which cannot be examined by deduction given that they’re not deducible) in theoretical knowledge, and it might play a similar role in practical knowledge. Thus, the phronimos might grasp first principles intuitively via nous, but is then able to support those first principles via dialectic and endoxa. The texts are inconclusive about this possibility, though.

We also need not think that all ethical principles are endoxa. For Aristotle, general philosophical principles (about metaphysics and psychology) play an important role in his ethics. Practical nous is concerned only with principles of conduct and is bound up with perceptions of instances of such principles.

At EN1143a35-b14, Aristotle distinguishes between two objects of nous:
1) undemonstrated principles
2) particular instances falling under the undemonstrated principles
These represent the starting and ending points of practical reasoning and are both undemonstrated (since particular instances aren’t demonstratable, only universals…)

Aristotle at 1143b4-5 seems to put forward an account of practical nous very similar to the account he put forward of theoretical nous. Thus he says that universals come from particulars and we thereby must have perception of particulars, which is called nous. Nous looks, then, like a process of induction. Aristotle puts emphasis on the perceptual role of nous, however. He says that “it is a natural endowment which develops with experience” (136).

Don’t the Stoics have something such that the sage (or anyone with a significant amount of training in a particular field) sees things differently than the regular person. They have (perhaps) a more refined power of katalepsis then the regular person. (Think: botanist and lay person in a forest) Perhaps something like this is going on here?

Aristotle appears to have assimilated the possession of an expert’s trained eye to a grasp of universal principles. But he does say that correct conduct can’t be formulated from generic universalizations but rather by particular circumstances under a trained eye.

“On that conception of phronesis general principles specify the end only indeterminately, for example one has a general conception of a good life which embraces virtues of character such as courage, but what it is to be courageous cannot be specified in any formula, but has to be recognised by the trained judgment (ie perception) of the courageous person” (136).

So for both theoretical and practical wisdom, general principles are fundamental and are grasped by nous. Nous arrives at these general principles by using some sort of primitive perceptual data.

One more entry about Taylor’s article in which he addresses Aristotle’s account of perception. But this looks like a nice breaking point for the notes and for the entry. Next up (hopefully, tomorrow) will be the last bit of the Taylor article.