Ton Deuteron Ploun

The word kritèrion comes from from kritèr; the -tèr ending denotes:
1) names from instruments
2) names for particular kinds of places
3) names for religious ceremonies and festivals
The word kritèrion falls under (1) and (2)

With re. to (2): kritèrion is used to refer to a courthouse or law court

The philosophical term ‘kritèrion’ is related to the Attic kritès which means ‘evaluator’ or ‘arbitor’.

The term ‘kritèrion’ doesn’t specify the type of instrument or method used. Indeed, we find diverse things being called kritèria tès alètheias.

Because many different philosophers considered a diverse range of things to be kritèria tès alètheias, we cannot use a translation that assigns the criterion a specific function. We cannot say, for example, that it is a ‘distinguishing mark’ or ’standard of truth’ as those denote specific functions which may not apply to all things called kritèria tès alètheias.
– we may be able to be more concrete in our translation of ‘kritèrion’ for particular times or particular schools.

Uses Before Epicurus

Plato at Rep 582a6: “By what should a thing be judged if it is to be judged correctly?” and at Tht 178b6: “Man is the measure of all things…for he has in himself the criterion for these things.” Aristotle uses it once at Met. K6 1063a3.

In Plato, criteria are 1) qualities or capacities (Rep.) or 2) faculties (Tht.) which provide an ability to evaluate the truth or falsity of 1) particular assertions (Rep.) or 2) opinions (Tht.).

In the Tht. passage and the Met. passage, ‘criterion’ is used in connection with the Protagorean thesis. This might be evidence that Protagoras initially used the term.

Epicurus

Epicurus did not use the term ‘kritèrion’ only as a term for a cognitive faculty because while aisthèsis might refer to a faculty, prolèpsis cannot be construed as a faculty. So E. used the term ‘kritèrion’ in at least two different uses. Striker is going to focus on this second use.

Kritèrion and Kanwn

Kanwn refers to a straight stick or rod to be used as a measuring tool. It is a tool for testing the straightness or crookedness of something and so the tool must itself be straight.

Using the idea of a kanwn, we should expect two things of a means of judgment:
1) it should itself be true
2) it should be able to serve as a means of testing truth

The Truth of Criteria

The truth of a criterion cannot be determined or tested in the same way as the truth or falsity of what is tested by it. The truth of a criterion must be assumed to be self-evident and not in need of verification. (Cicero mentions is (CITE?) and it is in KD XXIV)

There are two criteria: 1) aisthèseis and 2) prolèpseis

Aisthèsis
“Since Epicurus had claimed in another passage that there could be no criterion superior to perception, he was compelled to assert that all perceptions were true – ie self evidently true – or else to renounce the possibility of distinguishing truth from falsity” (34). If we accept this, then the truth of the senses cannot be taken as a fundamental postulate of Epicureanism.

It appears that the argument goes as follows: Epicurus was compelled to posit the absolute truth of perceptions because he claimed that perception was a foundational criterion (such that there could be no superior criterion). From this we see that the truth of the senses cannot be a fundamental postulate of Epicureanism.

I worry about this argument. Can’t we also say that Epicurus was motivated by his commitments regarding atomism and perception? While he does say, several times, that the senses must be true if we are going to avoid an infinite regress in confirmation or a collapse of truth and falsity he also provides a physical theory as to why the senses must be true. Why should we think that the epistemic motivations (regress, collapse of t & f) should take theoretical precedence in explaining Epicurus’ claims regarding the truth of the senses?

When E. talks of perceptions being true and false, we should understand him to mean ‘perceptions that (such and such is the case)’. “A perception is true when the proposition which expresses it is true” (35).

I’m not convinced. Why should we think that Epicurus MUST have been referring to the truth and falsity of propositions here? Why can’t we say that the Ancients may have had a different sort of notion of truth than we do, one that is not restricted to propositions? Plato talks of the Forms as being true but we can’t (or, at least, shouldn’t) say that the Forms are propositions. I’m simply not convinced that when Epicurus says that perceptions are always true that he cannot have simply meant the perceptions themselves are always true.

But what does it mean to say that a proposition expresses a perception? Which propositions can be taken as expressions of a perception?

Three different types of propositions have been taken as expressions of perceptions:
1) propositions concerning specific sense-objects (this is hot)
2) propositions concerning observable states of affairs
3) empirical generalizations
Epicurus appears to have used all three.

Epicurus clearly appeals to propositions of type (1). But these can’t act as a sufficient basis for knowledge of the perceptible world.

So Epicurus introduces the notion of ‘phantastikè epibolè tès dianoias’ to make use of propositions of type (2). ‘phantastikè epibolè tès dianoias’ involves focusing one’s mind on an object or state of affairs.

It’s hard to see how Epicurus justified the inclusion of propositions of type (3), as any arguments in support of the claim that all perceptions are true refer to individual perceptions.

Prolèpsis
There is an argument for the self-evidence of prolèpsis at Letter to Heroditus 37-8

The argument says that prolèpsis are requites
1) so that we may have a reference point against which to judge matters of opinion, inquiry and puzzlement
2) without prolèpsis, demonstration will go on endlessly
3) so these criteria are ncessary prerequisites of a demonstration

These prolèpseis must necessarily be grasped without further explanation if they are to serve as criteria.

Further, this infinite regress argument rests on TWO key facts:
1) we cannot rely on prolèpsis as a criteria
2) these criteria must be proved
It’s only if we accept both of these that we get an infinite regress.

This tells us something about prolèpseis: they are describable as demonstrated or are indemonstrable.
– so they are something which can be true or false and so cannot simply be mental images.

Prolèpseis are referred to 1) as seen (and so it is natural to conceive of them as images) and also 2) demonstrated or indemonstrable (and thus understood as propositions)

So we have an account of the notion of a prolèpsis: it is a self evident truth which must have been grasped at the outset of an inquiry.

Methods of Testing Beliefs

Criteria are used to test non-evident truths or falsehoods

A doxa is true if
1) it is confirmed (epimarturèsis) by enargeia
2) it is not refuted (ouk antimarturèsis) by enargeia
A doxa is false if
1) it is not confirmed (ouk epimarturèsis) by enargeia. (This occurs when the perception not-p occurs, not simply when the perception p does not occur)
2) it is refuted (antimarturèsis) by enargeia

(1)’s deal with beliefs that are prosmenon
(2)’s deal with beliefs that are adèlon

An adelon is false if it is refuted by an enargeia (the negation of a perceptional proposition follows from the adelon)

An adelon is true if it follows from some self-evident perceptual proposition.
– It can’t be sufficient to be compatible with the phenomena because that will allow opposite claims to both be true.

“An opinion concerning observable states of affairs which are neither confirmed nor not confirmed by perception counts as possibly true” (48).
– one opinion must be true, but we can’t determine which one. So when E. talks of something occuring pleonaxws, he isn’t saying all these ways ARE true but just that they are all POSSIBLY true.

A prolèpsis acts as a criterion in two ways:
1) Cases of the form ‘x is y’, the prolèpsis of x can be used to test whether the predicate (Y) follows from the prolèpsis of X.
2) In judging an opinion of the form ‘y is x’ we can test whether y has the qualities which an x (according to its prolèpsis) must have.

The Stoics and Skeptics

The stoics named several different things criteria. The official view says that the criterion of truth is a katalèptikè phantasia. A cataleptic impression is one that “comes from what is, is imprinted and impressed in exact accordance with what is, and is such that an impression of this kind could not come about from what is not” (51). They bear a ‘characteristic mark of truth’ by which they can be distinguished with certainty from false impressions.

What is meant in calling something like this a criterion of truth?

A katalèptikè phantasia is a criterion for the very state of affairs from which it arose.

The criterion isn’t an instrument to judge the truth or falsity of opinions (like E’s) but as a means to establish what is the case within the scope of perception.

The katalèptikè phantasia gives the conditions which must be met by an impression which leads to knowledge. If this impression can be characterized independently of its relation to the state of affairs which occasions it (by the ‘mark of truth’) then it could be taken as a sign of the existence of the SoA in question.

The same holds (basically) for the Skeptics (esp. Carneades), except:
– The Stoics hold that the criterion was a guarantee of the SoA
– Carneades denied that there could be such a guarantee

Chrysippus also said that prolèpsis and aisthèsis were criteria. In another book he named katalèptikè phantasia as a criteria. How to deal with this?

We can try to accomodate them by saying that prolèpsis and aisthèsis are elements which play a role in the formation of a katalèptikè phantasia. In this way, the use of prolèpsis as a criterion is the same as Epicurus’.