Ton Deuteron Ploun

From Epistemology, ed Stephen Everson.

Stoic epistemology addresses both ancient and contemporary concerns (concerns with both understanding and the nature of knowledge). Like the Epicureans, they’re empiricist. Knowledge is based on appearances.

Appearances are how the world appears to us. They make an imprint on us. This imprinting is a mental and physical act. Further, it is structured in a way that the mind can articulate.

In any perception, there will be
- an appearance, and
- some kind of acceptance of the propositional content of the appearance

The weakest sort of acceptance is assent (συνκαταθεσις)
The next strongest sort of acceptance is belief (δοξα)

Belief is assent to what is not apprehended (either what is false or rash assent to what is true).

“The latter is presumably assent to what is true, but as far as the person goes, might have been false, since his assent was rash and did not spring drom the firm and systematic grasp of the subject matter characteristic the person of knowledge.” (186)

But the Stoics want to say that anyone can have apprehensions, even those without systematic grasps charactistic of the person with knowledge. If the requirement for not having rash assent is that it springs from a firm and systematic grasp of anything, then very few people will not always engage in rash assent. Why can’t we just say that this is rash assent because the appearance is not apprehensive, and leave it at that?

Knowledge excludes belief and belief is a weak assent. We can understand this in two ways: first, the assent itself is weak (contrast with apprehensions which drag you to assent) and second, the belief is an assent made from weakness (the person lacks coherance, stability, and system).

The next stage is apprehension (καταληψις)

Apprehension is the stage where you cannot be wrong. It is assent to an apprehensive appearance (φαντασια καταληπτικη)

The final stage is knowledge (επιστημη) in which particular facts are grasped systematically, coherently, etc.
– Only the σοφος is capable of this
– It is unchangeable by argument
– It is a building up of beliefs
Knowledge is the culmination of the process which begins with one’s reactions to appearances.

One comes to form beliefs via appearances. One builds up a set of beliefs from those appearances, ensuring that they are systematic, consistent, coherant, stable, and so forth. It is only through this that one comes to have knowledge, and it is in this way that knowledge is a culmination of the process that begins with appearances.

Apprehension is the stage in which you cannot be wrong, and so 1) can be thought of as a sort of knowledge and 2) is the criterion of truth.

Because apprehensive appearances are so crucial to Stoic epistemology, we need an account of what they are. We get that in Sextus Empiricus 7: 241-58. Here we discover that an apprehensive appearance (AA) is:
1) from an in accordance with a real object
2) stamped and sealed
3) could not have come from an unreal object
4) older stoics say that it is the criterion only if the appearance has no obstacle

While S.E. expresses the definition of AA in terms of the relation between an appearance to a real or unreal object, Cicero says that what was important was not the object’s existence but rather the way that it is represented.

S.E. says that an AA represents the object in every detail while Cicero says that Zeno says that it represents objects only in part. (This will be important later).

AA’s are normal. Anyone can have them so long as the conditions are normal. The five conditions of normalicy are:
1) conditions of the sense organs
2) condition of the object
3) the placing of the object
4) the way the object is sensed
5) the agent’s state of mind

AA’s are representational objects – they are caused in a way that represents the object to the person’s mind.

The Stoic theory places a represntation object (the appearance) between the agent and the world:
agent appearance object in world
There’s a concern about the representational object bridging the gap between the agent and the world. Why should we be confident that the appearance accurately represents the way things are.

This appears to leave the Stoics open to a worry: why are we entitled to being confident that things are really as they are represented as being?

Note the difference here between the Epicureans and Stoics. The Epicureans also face this criticism and respond that there is no representation between the object and the world. The effluences hitting the eye just ARE the objects in the world that directly cause the perception in the agent. The Epicureans are able to avoid this issue, then. The Stoics aren’t.

We have two Academic arguments preserved in Cicero and S.E.:

Argument #1
There can be appearances with all the distinguishing marks of an apprehension (being striking and evident) but which nonetheless are false. (Consider the visions of a madman)

The Stoics just deny this and claim that there IS a difference 1) either phenomenologically or 2) in the state the experience is had in.

The Skeptics reassert that there is no difference.

Argument #2
There are some objects that we cannot tell apart (two eggs, for example). So someone can have an AA of one egg and thereby has an indistinguishable appearance of a different object (the other egg). This leads us to conclude that an AA cannot possess a mark which distinguishes it from something which is like it. (See S.E. 7:408-11)

The Stoics respond to this in two ways
* No two things are exactly alike and so some difference will be reflected (the Stoics have an account of the identity of indescernables, thus this isn’t just an ad hoc response)
* We could, if we tried hard enough, distinguish between the two seemingly indescernable things (two eggs, for example). Just because we can’t usually distinguish between two things doesn’t mean they’re actually indistinguishable.

Because of the two Academic arguments (above), we see three changes in the Stoic account.
FIRST, the final clause of the definition was added
SECOND, Zeno initially claimed an AA didn’t represent the object in every detail
THIRD, the later Stoics added the clause ‘being no obstacle’

FIRST CHANGE: THE FINAL CLAUSE
The Stoics added that an AA was such that it couldn’t come from an unreal object. This appears to be in response to argument 1 (above).

But the Stoic response to argument 1 demands some response. What is the difference between the objects (because they claim that there will always be a difference)?
– is it a phenomenological difference?
This is a weak response that appears to miss the point of the criticism.
– is it that the AA is distinguished by its causal history (ie that it is produced in a normal state)?
This response would settle the matter…but the debate continued. The skeptics future responses would be irrelevant if this is the proper way to interpret the Stoics’ response.

Perhaps Zeno’s position was indeterminate. Perhaps he didn’t sharply distinguish between two key ideas:

IDEA A: Apprehension requires that a person is in the right relation to the object known

IDEA B: Apprehension requires a person is in the right relation to the object known and this fact is available to her.

The skeptics are pressing on idea B.

We see that this debate between the Stoics and skeptics revolve around the question of what is sufficient for knowledge.
- if idea A is, then the Academics seem to miss the point with their criticisms
- if idea B is, then the Stoics seem to miss something that the Academics are pressing them on.

We see, then, that there is a disagreement about what knowledge requires.

SECOND CHANGE: PARTIAL OR TOTAL REPRESENTATION
S.E. says that an AA represents every feature; Zeno says that is represents only some features.

Argument #2 seems to motivate this change. If an AA represents the object in every detail, and no two objects are exactly similar, then an AA will have a distinguishing mark.

But the debate DID continue…so the answer cannot be that simple.

The response relies on the identity of indescernables and the claim that the distinguishing mark can be discovered, at least by experts.

The Stoics don’t say that no one save the σοφος can discern the distinguishing mark. It is perplexing why they don’t. Why do they refer to Delian poultry farmers and the like rather than say that the two objects are discernable but only the σοφος can disern them?

This hesitancy on the part of the Stoics uncovers a serious philosophical question: “Is it sufficient for knowledge that I should merely be in the right relation to the object of knowledge [idea a, above], or is it also required that this relation should be something available to me [idea b, above]?” (199)

The Stoics begin with idea b (via Zeno’s demand). But the Skeptics respond with argument #2. This leads the Stoics to strengthen the condition for an AA, although they must tacitly weaken the conditions for an AA from idea b to idea a. The Academics seems to continue to press the issue, though, which indicates that the Stoics were indeterminate between (a) and (b).

Zeno’s original demand: an AA should enable the person to distinguish its object. The Stoics (μεν) strengthen the condition for an AA by saying that it represents every feature of the appearance, but also (δε) weaken the condition by saying that it can be an AA only if you are in the right relation to it (you yourself need not be able to discern the difference). This appears to remove Zeno’s original demand (right??) and shift from (b) to (a).

THIRD CHANGE: REMOVAL OF AN OBSTACLE
The Stoics must have been unhappy to have been forced from idea (b) to idea (a) as it means that someone can have a criterion of truth but be unable to use it. Because of this, we see later Stoics adding that an AA is a criterion of truth only if there is no obstacle. This suggests unhappiness with the idea that one has a criterion of truth but is unable to use it.

We should take the reference to exterinal situations to refer to a normal appearance where a person’s beliefs form an obstacle to accepting the AA as such. BUT, we have to rely on far fetched stories for this (ie Menelaus and Helen in Euripides’ play). This is problematic because
* we must bring in powerful and irresponsible gods (or something similar)
* this doesn’t help in cases where someone is in an abnormal experience and doesn’t realize it.
* Apprehension seems to love its position as a kind of knowledge. We don’t seem able to distinguish it from επιστημη any more. Apprehension was originally supposed to be available to all, but now it looks to demand a consistent and coherant system of beliefs. (So it is like επιστημη and it will not be available to all.)

Conclusion:
The Stoics begin with a common sensical theory but are indetermined as to whetehr apprehension requires idea a or idea b. (b) is more intuitive and the skeptics press them on this. This forces the Stoics to retreat to (a) but in doing so makes their account less common sensical and it renders AA’s an unusable criterion of truth.