Ton Deuteron Ploun

My summer will be spent thinking largely about Plato’s account of the knower. What is the knower like? What skills or powers does the knower have in virtue of having knowledge? What character traits does the knower have, qua knower? The idea is that Plato talks about knowers, about people who have knowledge, and I’m going to spend the summer trying to get clear about just what sort of person this knower is.

Think about it this way: in ethics, or at least in virtue ethics, we say that a virtuous person does certain things (does the right thing, acts in accordance with the mean, acts as the virtuous agent would, or what have you) and we also say that a virtuous person is a sort of way (has certain character traits, is generous, is brave, and so forth). To give an account of the ethically virtuous person, we need to give some sort of account of what that person does and how that person is. And it’s not at all clear, and is often explicitly denied, that giving an account of what the person does is sufficient to understanding how the person is. To fully understand the nature of the ethically virtuous person, we need to give an account of her capacities for action (and her actions themselves) and her character. I think the same holds for the account of the knower. The knower does certain things (has certain capacities or powers that are actualized; for Plato, the knower will be able to survive dialectic, will be able to give an account of the aitia, and so forth) but also is a certain way. She has certain character traits, of both the intellectual and, for Plato, the ethical, variety. And these character traits are essential features of being a knower. So, just as in the case of the ethically virtuous person, here too in order to fully understand the nature of the knower, we need to give an account both of the intellectual capacities of the knower (the capacities one has in virtue of having knowledge) and the traits that characterize the knower.

So far so good, right? Well. Sort of. There’s something that I need to argue for before I can just jump in to this chapter. What is that? I’m making an assumption here (one that is probably glaringly obvious to most folks) — I’m assuming that giving a full account of the knower will involve more than simply giving an account of the nature of knowledge. I’m assuming that there are important character traits that are essential features of the knower and that we can’t understand them just by giving an account of the nature of knowledge. Understanding the nature of knowledge is not sufficient to understand the nature of the knower. And that’s not an assumption I just get to make. I need to argue that this is something that we can see in Plato.

Here’s a more general way to think about it: I need to argue that the relationship between the dunamis and the possessor of that dunamis is a complex, rather than simple, relationship. What do I mean by that? Most broadly, the question is asking whether we can fully characterize the nature of the possessor of a dunamis simply in virtue of the nature of the dunamis itself, or whether the possessor of the dunamis possesses other things (what sorts of things? Character traits, other abilities, who knows…) that are not explained in virtue of the possession of that dunamis and thus, giving an account of a dunamis will not be sufficient for giving an adequate account of the possessor of that dunamis. Whew. That’s a mouthful. And thoroughly unclear, I think.

Let’s us the dunamis of rhetoric as an example. What is the relationship between rhetoric and the rhetorician? Is it a simple one — will giving an account of the dunamis of rhetoric fully characterize the rhetorician (qua rhetorician)? Or is the relationship more complex — will we be missing something in our characterization of the rhetorician if we only give an account of rhetoric? Let’s say that we can give a full account of the nature of rhetoric. It’s a dunamis and we are able to fully describe the powers and capacities that it imparts to the possessor of that dunamis. The rhetorician, in virtue of being a rhetorician will be able to do x, y, and z. If we are able to fully characterize the dunamis of rhetoric, will we thereby have fully characterized the nature of the rhetorician qua rhetorician (e.g. is a rhetorician simply someone who can do x, y, and z)? Or, even if we are able to fully articulate the dunamis of rhetoric, may we not need to still describe something more in order to give a full account of the nature of the rhetorician?

So.
Simple relationship between a dunamis and the possessor of that dunamis: one can fully understand the nature of the possessor of a dunamis by understanding the nature of the dunamis itself.
Complex relationship between a dunamis and the possessor of that dunamis: one cannot fully understand the nature of the possessor of a dunamis by understanding the nature of the dunamis itself. (Because the possessor of the dunamis has certain features that aren’t explained by virtue of the nature of the dunamis itself.)
The general question: Is there a simple or complex relationship between a dunamis and the possessor of that dunamis in Plato’s discussions of dunameis?

At this point, though, I’m wavering between two different ways to approach this question.

1) I can start by looking at the more particular question of the relationship between the dunamis of knowledge and the knower. This will involve focusing a great deal on Republic six (where we can see Plato describe the characteristics of the knower but in an importantly different way than he characterized the dunamis of knowledge in Republic five). From there (having shown that the relationship, in the case of knowledge, is complex) I can then move on to the more general question and see whether what holds for knowledge holds for other dunameis and if not, why not.

2) I can start by thinking about the topic more generally. What is the relationship between the dunamis and the possessor of that dunamis? Is it simple? Complex? Are there some instances in which it is simple and others in which it is complex? If it is this last case (which, at the moment, I think it is) then how can we explain why it is that in some cases the relationship is simple and in others it is complex? (And, of course, where does the dunamis of knowledge fit in to this schema?)

I’m leaning towards the second approach at this point (although I’ve already written up an introduction to the issue wherein I say I’m going to opt for the first approach so clearly my thoughts at the moment are rather fluid). What might be very useful at this point, though, is just to look at three or four different dunameis that Plato talks about and see how he characterizes the dunamis itself and the possessor of that dunamis. That’s going to be pretty crucial for either approach here. I’ve already done this a bit with rhetoric and will try to write something up about it soon. I wonder what other dunameis might be useful to look at here.